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Abstract - This paper examines the impact of regulatory reform on productivity growth and 
its components for Indian banks in 1992-2009. We use parametric and non-parametric 
techniques to estimate efficiency frontiers, followed by a Divisia index and a Malmquist 
index of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) respectively. To account for technology 
heterogeneity we utilise a metafrontier approach, which allows us to identify technology 
gaps among ownership types (i.e. state, private and foreign). Results are consistent across 
methodologies and show that the Indian banking industry experienced sustained productivity 
growth, driven mainly by technological progress. Furthermore, results indicate that different 
ownership types react differently to changes in the operating environment. The position of 
foreign banks becomes increasingly dominant over time and their production technology 
becomes the best practice in the industry.   
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I. Introduction 
 
The past two decades have witnessed deregulatory policy reforms in banking industries 
around the world. These reforms have aimed to increase competition in order to promote 
productive financial systems, which would ultimately foster the development of the real 
economy. Deregulation is usually expected to stimulate productivity growth via the general 
advancement of production technology and the efficiency improvements of individual 
banks.
1
 Re-regulation, on the other hand, is often expected to work as a constraint on the 
activity of banks with the aim of long term stability. Empirical evidence to support these 
aforementioned assertions is mixed, with some studies reporting improvements in 
productivity following financial reforms, while others suggest little, no, or even negative 
productivity growth.
2
 Differences in empirical findings are likely to arise from: differences 
in the applied modelling techniques utilised; difficulties in disentangling the sources of 
productivity growth (arising from technological progress, scale or efficiency improvements); 
and complex relationships between ownership structure, and efficiency and productivity 
changes.
 3
  
It is against this background that we seek to extend previous research by presenting an 
assessment of the effects of regulatory reforms on productivity growth, its sources, and on 
the relationship between bank performance and ownership types for Indian banks over the 
period 1992 to 2009. The Indian case is particularly suited to our research questions since it 
is a representative illustration of a gradualist approach to reform a banking system that was 
characterised by financial repression. The reforms started in 1992 and were guided by two 
Narasimham Committee reports, in 1991 and 1998 respectively. The period 1992-1997 saw 
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the introduction of policy instruments aimed at promoting competition (deregulation), 
whereas from 1998 onwards the policy focus shifted towards the long run stability of the 
banking system (prudential re-regulation).
 4
  The whole reform process can thus be divided, 
at least in theory, in two stages with the year 1997 as the watershed. Moreover, the Indian 
Government introduced a uniform regulatory framework to the different ownership types, 
which gives us an opportunity to investigate the impact of regulatory reform on the 
ownership-performance relationship in a market with a level playing field.
5
  
Methodologically, we utilise two complementary approaches: a non-parametric metafrontier 
sequential Malmquist TFP index and a parametric metafrontier Divisia index. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to perform an analysis of productivity change and its 
components within a metafrontier framework, both in a parametric and non-parametric 
setting. To test whether different approaches lead to similar policy conclusions, both share a 
common framework in terms of dataset, variable definition and behavioural assumptions. 
Having estimated technology gaps between ownership specific frontiers and metafrontier, a 
natural extension is to analyse them more closely and then test for convergence, that is the 
attainment of productivity equality in the long run. We do this by using the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. 
To anticipate our main results, we find that the reforms have fostered sustained TFP growth, 
driven mainly by technological progress. Results also indicate that state-owned, private and 
foreign banks reacted differently to changes in the operating environment. Specifically, 
regulatory changes generated a very favourable environment for foreign banks, which 
enabled them to use the best available technology in the industry and engage in cost 
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technology innovation. On the other hand, the increasing technological gap between the best 
practice and the private and state banks frontiers indicates a lack of significant technological 
spillovers between different types of bank. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data set and the variables used in the construction 
of the estimable models, while Section 4 presents a detailed exposition of the methodology 
utilised. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings and finally Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. Literature review 
There is a vast literature investigating bank efficiency, its components and its determinants 
using both parametric and non parametric approaches.
 6
 Most studies have measured 
technical and cost efficiency and, to a lesser extent, revenue and profit efficiency and 
productivity change. While early studies investigate mainly the US and EU banking markets, 
in recent years the number of studies focusing on developing countries has increased, mainly 
due to the unprecedented economic reforms implemented in those countries. Indian banking 
is no exception and starting from the mid-1990s the outcomes of the Indian reform process 
have been extensively analysed. Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) investigated the productivity 
growth of Indian public sector banks in the pre-reform period (1970 - 1992) and found that 
nationalisation curtailed bank productivity growth. Kumbahakar and Sarkar (2003)'s sample 
included both public sector and private banks in the period 1985-1996 and found that 
reforms did not deliver the expected TFP growth. The empirical literature on developing 
nations generally finds relatively low efficiency of state-owned institutions. In India, though, 
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a number of studies, using competing methodologies and different time periods, seem to 
provide convincing evidence of higher average cost (and profit) efficiency of public sector 
banks (Sathye, 2003; Bhaumik and Dimova, 2004; Sensarma, 2006; Das and Ghos, 2006; 
2009; Zhao et al., 2010; Ray and Das, 2010, among others). Das and Ghosh (2006) posit that 
public banks might be more efficient as government ownership may have facilitated 
recapitalisation at the onset of reforms. The literature seems also to agree on the poor 
performance of smaller private banks and on the considerable differences among banks both 
in terms of efficiency and productivity change.  
The fact that the three ownership types co-exist and, to a certain extent, compete on the 
Indian banking market does not imply that they form a homogenous group. State, private and 
foreign ownership entail different organisational forms and incentive structures, which are 
likely to result in different operational behaviour. At the macro level, Bhaumik et al. (2011) 
find evidence that different ownership types react differently to monetary policy initiatives 
of the Reserve Bank of India. These varying reactions might be driven by differences in the 
structure of their balance sheet, particularly in terms of asset composition (Stein, 1998). 
Theory suggests a number reasons as to why different types of banks lend to different types 
of firms, mostly based on information asymmetries. For example, Stein (2002) suggests that 
foreign banks may be less able to process "soft" information about local firms and therefore 
may be prefer to lend to more "transparent" larger firms. Foreign banks might also have a 
comparative advantage in granting large loans. In contrast, state-owned banks often have to 
lend to "priority sectors" such as small and medium size enterprises, state-owned firms and 
  6
firms in rural areas. Based on Indian data, Berger et al. (2008) find evidence of these 
different lending relationships.  
These significant differences are often overlooked by the existing bank efficiency literature; 
however the importance of properly accounting for heterogeneity has been highlighted in a 
handful of recent studies (Bos and Schmiedel, 2007; Kontolaimou and Tsekouras, 2010). 
The assumption underlying the estimation of efficiency against a common frontier is that all 
banks in the industry are homogenous and utilise the same technology. If this assumption is 
not correct it will result in biased estimations and efficiency measures. Koetter and 
Poghosyan (2009) identify two main types of systematic differences across and within 
national banking markets: the first type of heterogeneity pertains to the environment in 
which banks operate and is exogenous to managers, although it affects their choice of 
available technology. The second type pertains to managerial choices and therefore affects 
efficiency, that is the ability to attain the optimum benchmark rather than the shape of the 
efficient frontier. Our study builds upon this recent strand of literature by employing the 
metafrontier approach (Battese et al., 2004; O'Donnell et al., 2008) to account for the 
possibility of technological differences among ownership types. 
 
III. Data and variable definition 
A. Data 
The data were collected from the Reserve Bank of India and cover all commercial banks 
(foreign, domestic private and state owned) operating in India from 1992 until 2009.   
With the guide of homogeneity criteria and in line with previous literature, we excluded 
regional rural banks and foreign banks that consistently had less than two branches over the 
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entire sample period. In both cases, their lines of business are very different from the nation- 
wide operations of other commercial banks. The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel 
data set of a total of 1230 observations. Table 1 gives a snapshot of the relative weight of the 
three ownership categories and of how the sample relates to the total market (proportion of 
total assets). All data were deflated using the GDP deflator using 1991 as a base year. 
 
< Insert Table 1> 
 
B. Variable definition 
To identify the inputs and outputs variables we follow the intermediation approach (Sealey 
and Lindley, 1977) and employ a two-inputs, three-outputs specification. The three chosen 
outputs are performing loans (y1); other earning assets (y2) and fee-based income (y3).
7
 The 
revenues with respect to these three outputs are given by interest income on loans, interest 
income on total other earning assets and non-interest income respectively.
 8
 The two chosen 
inputs are total loanable funds (the sum of deposits and money market funding) and non-
interest operating cost (which includes both the cost of the labour input and of physical 
capital). The price for total loanable funds (w1) is calculated as the ratio of total interest 
expenditure to total loanable funds, and the price for non-interest operating cost (w2) is given 
by the ratio between non-interest operating cost and total assets. The number of branches is 
also introduced separately to proxy for size. Summary statistics for outputs and inputs are 
given in Table 2.  
To account for the macroeconomic environment and prevent bias especially in the estimation 
of technical change we also include the cash reserve ratio (CRR), the statutory liquidity ratio 
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(SLR) and the ratio of banking finance to GDP as a measure of the reliance of the economy 
upon the banking sector as opposed to other sources of finance. Finally in the econometric 
specification we also specify a dummy variable R to capture the period before and after re-
regulation (before and after 1997).  
<Insert Table 2> 
IV. Methodology 
A. Empirical framework 
The measurement total factor productivity change (TFP) and its components can be 
performed via the estimation of efficiency frontiers, either using Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA) or Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which lead respectively to the calculation of a 
Divisia index of TFP change and of a Malmquist index of TFP (Malmquist, 1953).
9
 In this 
paper we make a number of methodological contributions to the literature: firstly, we use 
both parametric and non-parametric techniques as they have well known complementary 
properties and consistency in their results strengthens the analysis and is particularly useful 
for regulators and other decision makers (Bauer et al., 1998; Casu et al., 2004). To improve 
comparability, we implement a sequential DEA approach (Tulken and Vanden Eeckaut, 
1995) which leads to the estimation of a sequential Malmquist TFP index. In addition, unlike 
most of the literature, for the decomposition of the Malmquist index we do not follow Färe et 
al. (1994), since their method, albeit very popular, is actually valid only under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale. We follow instead the method proposed by Ray and 
Desli (1997), which is valid under variable returns to scale and allows the proper separation 
of scale effects from the rest. Finally, we recognise the heterogeneous nature of our data 
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across ownership types, and therefore we address this issue in the context of a metafrontier 
framework (Battese et al, 2004; O'Donnell et al, 2008). We then estimate both a non-
parametric sequential metafrontier Malmquist TFP index and a parametric metafrontier 
Divisia index to assess productivity change.  
B. Group-specific frontiers: SFA, DEA and Divisia and Malmquist indexes 
In an input minimization perspective, an efficiency frontier is defined as the minimum level 
of input(s) for a given level of output(s), and the efficiency of a firm can be measured by 
means of a “distance function” D (Shephard 1953, 1970): this is a radial measure of the 
distance of that firm from the frontier such that D = 1 when the firm is fully efficient and 
D>1 otherwise. 
Data Envelopment Analysis constructs a piece-wise linear convex frontier from the linear 
combination of the best practices among the observations (Charnes et al., 1978, 1981). In the 
case of i=1…N firms that produce m=1,….,M outputs using j=1…,J inputs at time t and with 
variable returns to scale, the efficiency of each firm is calculated by solving the following 
linear programming problem (once for each firm): 
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For the calculation of TFP we follow Ray and Desli (1997) and we define the Malmquist 
index for the k-th ownership between any two times t and t+1 and with variable returns to 
scale as: 
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From (2) we can see that the Malmquist index is calculated as the ratio of distance functions 
and it is given by the product of three components: the change in efficiency (EC), 
technological change (TC), and scale change (SC).
 10
  For each of these components, a score 
larger/smaller than unity indicates an improvement/worsening of the corresponding measure 
and a score equal to 1 indicates no change. The same is true for the overall TFP measure 
resulting from the multiplication of the three scores.  
Equation (1) is usually estimated separately for each time period, and the resulting 
Malmquist index therefore compares year pairs every time independently; this often 
translates into wide oscillations, as shifts of the frontier induced by random shocks are 
confused with changes in technology. We avoid this problem by estimating (1) and (2) 
sequentially (Tulken and Vanden Eeckaut, 1995). This means that the estimation of (1) (and 
therefore subsequently of (2)) is conducted each time including not only the current year but 
also all the years preceding it, which is equivalent to assuming that technological knowledge 
accumulates over time.
 11
 The sequential estimation has also the additional advantage of 
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reducing the well known dimensionality problem of DEA
12
, and it also enhances the 
comparability with SFA that uses time trends to model technological change (O’ Donnell et 
al, 2008).  
The stochastic frontier model is an econometric method that consists of a (cost or production 
or profit) function with a composite error term, made up of two separate, although jointly 
estimated, components: stochastic noise and inefficiency (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and 
Van den Broek, 1977). In this paper we estimate a stochastic translog cost frontier with non 
constant inefficiency whose mean depends upon a set of covariates (Battese and Coelli 
1995)
13
. We choose a translog functional form so our model is  
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where vit~N(0, σ2) is noise and itu ~N+(į’Zit, 2u ) is inefficiency, modelled as  
 itit RTTTu   3210                    (4) 
with İit ~N(0, 2 ) truncated at the variable point itZ'  to allow for the non-negativity 
constraint on uit, so that İit ≥ itZ' .   
In (3) itC  is the observed total operating cost of bank i at time t, and it depends on inputs 
prices w and outputs y. R is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for the period following re-
regulation (1998-2009) and T is time; together with their interaction with inputs and outputs 
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they model (neutral and non neutral) technical change and changes in technology following 
re-regulation. The exogenous environmental variables that we described in the data section 
are in the vector E.
 
Equation (4) models inefficiency as a function of time and re-regulation, as the relevance of 
the difference between ownerships is already captured by the estimation of separate 
frontiers
14
. Equations (3) and (4) are estimated simultaneously by Maximum Likelihood.  
Following the procedure outlined in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) we define and calculate 
the Divisia index of TFP change for each of the k ownerships as 
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The index therefore is computed as the sum of six components, a positive net value in each 
of which translates into a positive growth in TFP, to be interpreted as follows. The first 
component measures the scale effect (SC
k
). The second component represents technological 
progress, measured as shifts of the frontier due to the passing of time (TC
k
). The third 
component measures the impact on TFP of all the environmental variables in (3) (EX
k
). The 
fourth term is a measure of allocative inefficiency, specified as a deviation of the observed 
inputs cost shares from their optimal ones (ALLC
k
). The fifth component measures the 
change in cost efficiency (EC
k
) and finally the last is the so-called mark-up effect (MU
k
), 
representing departures from marginal cost pricing and/or from an equi-proportionate mark-
up for every output (Denny et al., 1981; Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2005). 
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To compute equation (5) for the ownership specific cases we use the parameters estimates of 
equations (3) and (4).  
 
C. The estimation of metafrontiers 
When firms in different groups (countries, industry, ownership types etc.) face different 
technologies their (production or cost functions and) frontiers have to be estimated 
separately, precluding the possibility of comparisons among them. More formally, if there 
are k different technology sets in an input perspective at every time t there will be k different 
input sets each defined as   feasibleisXYXL ktktktkt ),(:  
The idea behind the metafrontier is that all L
k
t sets belong to a common unrestricted 
technology set L*t : 
}.......{ 321* kttttt LLLLL      
to which each of the k groups has potential access. 
The metafrontier is defined as the boundary of this unrestricted technology set and it is 
derived as the envelope of the group frontiers, identifying a metatechnology that is assumed 
to be available to all the firms in the sample. 
In SFA the metafrontier is estimated by linear or quadratic programming (Battese 2004) as 
an overarching function that envelops the single group frontiers. Define 
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as the k-th group cost frontier, depending on the whole matrix of independent variables X 
and a vector of group specific parameters βk. The metafrontier can be defined as the envelope 
of the k estimations of (6) as 
*)exp(*)(*  ititit XXfC        (7) 
So it has the same functional form of (6) with a vector of parameters β* that has to be 
estimated subject to the constraint that 
Xitȕ* ≤Xitȕk         (8) 
that is the meta cost technology gives the minimum possible cost available among all the 
groups. 
Equation (7) can be estimated by linear programming, hence solving 
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subject to (8).
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 The radial distance of each unit from the metafrontier is called 
metaefficiency and it is defined as 
k
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which given (6) is equivalent to
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Equation (11) means that the metaefficiency of firm i of group k at time t is made of two 
parts: the first is its group specific cost efficiency )exp( kit
k
it uEFF  , with 10  kitEFF . 
The second is known as technological gap ratio (TGR), and it measures the distance 
between the metafrontier and the group specific frontier; TGR ≤1 with higher values 
indicating a closer proximity to the metafrontier and lower values indicating a larger gap 
  15
between the two. Empirically one would first estimate EFF
k
 and TGR and compute the EFF* 
subsequently as their product.
  
In DEA, which is already a linear programming technique, the estimation of a metafrontier is 
the estimation of a general unrestricted frontier using all the group data together. Similarly to 
SFA also in DEA we will have that 
k
it
it
it
EFF
EFF
TGR
* . 
Coming finally to the calculation of TFP change, this has to be based upon the metafrontier 
results. For the Divisia index we perform the calculations in (5) using the estimated 
coefficients from the metafrontier obtained from (9) and (8). Given the specification of (10) 
and to avoid double counting of technological progress the cost efficiency measure used in 
the Divisia has to remain the group-specific cost efficiency.
 
 
The metafrontier Malmquist index is computed as in (2) but using the metatechnology as a 
reference point so that  
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V. Empirical results 
To test whether the various ownership types are operating under the same technology and 
therefore the data can be pooled under a single frontier, we used both parametric and non-
parametric techniques: t-test, Mann-Whitney, Kruskall-Wallis (KW) test and Kolmogorov-
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Smirnov (KS) test for DEA, as well as an LR test in SFA (Aly et al., 1990;  Elyasiani and 
Mehdian, 1990; Isik and Hassan, 2002). The results are reported in Table A1 in the appendix 
and show that the null hypothesis of a common technology is generally rejected, leading us 
to conclude that it is appropriate to construct cost efficiency frontiers separately for each 
ownership group.  
A. Ownership specific analysis of Total Factor Productivity 
The first part of the analysis therefore consists of estimating ownership-specific frontiers and 
their TFP changes and components. For the parametric analysis, we follow Battese and 
Coelli (1995) and estimate equations (3) and (4) simultaneously with a Maximum Likelihood 
one-step procedure. Linear homogeneity of degree one in input prices and Young’s 
symmetry are imposed prior to estimation. In the non-parametric analysis, we follow a 
sequential Data Envelopment Analysis approach (Tulken and Vanden Eeckaut, 1995). This 
particular approach assumes that technical knowledge accumulates over time hence implying 
a certain dependence in the production process; this reduces the wide oscillations typical of 
DEA as the frontier will be moving forward in the presence of technical progress and remain 
static otherwise. The use of sequential DEA should improve the comparability of the two 
methodologies. Nonetheless, due to the fundamental characteristics of the two approaches, 
we would expect the DEA results to be more extreme and, in the presence of technological 
progress, to show larger technology changes than efficiency changes.  
The most important things to notice about this initial part of the analysis are that the SFA 
coefficients and elasticities have the expected signs, inefficiency is significant for all 
ownerships, whilst the passing of time and the introduction of re-regulation have mixed 
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effects on the technological choices of the three ownerships.
16
 Furthermore, foreign banks 
show an increase in the optimal scale of production of performing loans and a decrease in 
that of other earning assets, contrary to both private and state banks. This is consistent with 
the removal of restrictions on their operations, which progressively allowed foreign banks to 
increasingly familiarize themselves with the local loans market. As illustrated in Table 3, 
both SFA and DEA show high average levels of efficiency (about 90%) that slightly worsen 
after re-regulation; these results are not significantly the difference in results between the 
two methodologies, with the exception of those of private banks which DEA ranks as 
remarkably less efficient than SFA.
17
 
<Insert Table 3> 
Moving on to the measurement of productivity, as we can see in Table 4 TFP overall is 
increasing over time, and the difference between the DEA Malmquist and the SFA Divisia is 
not statistically significant; the only difference between the two methodologies is in the point 
estimates of technology change, but the general trends and the actual change rates of TFP are 
not statistically different.
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 This improvement is mainly due to improvements in technology, 
with DEA recording as expected higher values than SFA.  
<Insert Table 4> 
These ownership-specific results do now allow us to draw any inference at the industry level. 
Therefore, to compare results across ownership groups we therefore move on to compute 
estimates relative to a metafrontier.  
B.  Metafrontier analysis of Total Factor Productivity 
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We estimate metafrontiers using both DEA and SFA techniques, followed by a generalised 
sequential metafrontier Malmquist index and a metafrontier Divisia index. To allow more 
flexible modelling of the passing of time on technology in SFA we estimate two separate 
metafrontiers, one for 1992-1997 and one for the 1998-2009.
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The coefficients of the two SFA-based metafrontiers are reported in Table A3 in the 
appendix. Tables 5 and 6 report the metafrontier Divisia index results and the metafrontier 
Malmquist index results derived from SFA and DEA respectively. 
<Insert Table 5 and 6> 
The results are consistent across methodologies (all the comparable series are not 
significantly different) and find an increase in overall TFP especially after 1998. If we do not 
take into account the environmental factors in the Divisia (refer to column TFP2 in Table 5) 
the figures are even closer, with an overall average yearly improvement between 0.4% and 
1.4% before 1998 and increasing to about 3% per year afterwards. The main contributor to 
these TFP changes is always technological progress. As expected, in DEA this is more 
marked and translates into a worsening of efficiency, whereas SFA gives lower technical 
improvements and marginally positive efficiency changes. Finally, the scale component 
worsens in all cases, going from mildly increasing returns to scale pre-1997 to mildly 
decreasing returns to scale post 1998. 
C.  Metaefficiency and Technology Gap Ratios 
The metafrontier framework allows us to decompose differences in overall performance 
(metaefficiency) into cost efficiency and technology gap ratio (TGR), where the TGR 
measures the distance between the group frontier and the metafrontier.
20
 While the former 
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relates mainly to the performance of a firm's management, the latter represents the nature of 
the production environment (O'Donnell et al., 2008). In this context, regulatory changes 
influence the environmental characteristics of the market, therefore an analysis of technology 
gaps can provide important information on the outcomes of the deregulation process. 
Table 7 reports the average technology gap ratios (TGR), cost efficiency and metaefficiency 
scores for the whole industry and the different ownerships, for DEA and SFA. The Table 
shows that industry technology improves over time, as indicated by the widening gap 
between the metafrontier and the single ownership frontiers (the decreasing TGR values).
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In particular, while before 1998 state banks are the sector leaders in terms of efficiency and 
technology, followed by foreign and private banks, after 1998 they lose technological 
leadership in favour of foreign banks. In DEA this swap is clear and statistically significant; 
in SFA the pattern is the same but less marked, with the difference between the two 
ownerships becoming much smaller and not significant. 
<Insert Table 7> 
This improvement in the position of foreign banks is confirmed when we look at individual 
data points and calculate the number and sample proportion of technology leaders for each 
ownership. In this context, we define technology leaders or innovators as those banks with a 
TGR =1 and therefore those which are using the best available technology. This is shown in 
Table 8 where again we can see the increasingly dominant position of foreign banks after 
1998
22
.  
<Insert Table 8> 
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To corroborate these results, in Figures 1 and 2 we present the histograms and kernel density 
estimations of technological gap ratios for the three ownership types, separately for the 
periods 1992-1997 and 1998-2009. 
<Insert Figures 1 and 2> 
The figures quite clearly show how the TGR distribution changes after 1998, with state 
banks in particular losing their lead position whilst the concentration of leaders for foreign 
banks becomes higher than for the rest of the sample.  
D. Catch up Index 
Whilst very informative, the TGR is a static measure of leadership. To look further into the 
issue of technological leadership we follow Chen and Yang (2011) and construct a catch-up 
index, given by the ratio of the technical change of the i-th bank against the metafrontier  
(
*
itTC )  to its technical change against the k-th ownership frontier (
k
itTC ) , that is: 
k
it
it
it
TC
TC
CU
*
                                                                                               
(13) 
 
CU therefore measures the dynamics of the changes in technological leadership among 
different ownership types, with lower values indicating a speeding of the catch up process. 
The results are reported in Table 9; they are not significantly different between DEA and 
SFA and indicate that the best practices among foreign banks are narrowing their technical 
gap at a faster speed than state or private banks. The speed of the catch up process decreases 
over time for all ownership types. State banks appear to be the slowest in the sample in terms 
of catching up with the best available technology.  
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The overall picture therefore seems to indicate that the change in regulatory regime 
generated a very favourable environment for the best practices of foreign banks to use the 
best available technology and engage in cost technology innovation.   
<Insert Table 9> 
D. Further robustness and convergence test 
Finally, to check on the robustness of the above conclusion we test for the convergence of 
the ownership specific frontiers towards the metafrontier, based on a reduced form of their 
respective dynamic processes (see for example Thirtle et al., 2003). Define 
k
tTC   the change 
of technology of the k-th ownership frontier at time t, 
*
tTC  the change of technology of the 
metafrontier at time t, and assume that the growth processes are given by: 
t
k
tk
t
t
k
k
t TC
TC
TC
TC    111 ln*lnln                                                            (14) 
 
and 
ttt TCTC   1*ln**ln                                                                                    (15) 
 
where Ȗk  and Ȗ* are the asymptotic growth rates of kTC  and *TC  respectively and λ 
measures the speed of  catch up between them. Combining (14) and (15) we get: 
t
t
k
t
k
t
k
t
TC
TC
TC
TC    11*ln)1(*)(*ln      (16) 
We estimate (16) for each of the ownership types, using both DEA and SFA results, and 
conduct an ADF test to check for the presence of a unit root; namely the presence of a unit 
root (λ=0) implies that there is no catching up between the ownership specific frontier and 
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the metafrontier. Conversely the difference between them will be stationary if the null of a 
unit root is rejected and λ >0, with full convergence found if also the intercept (Ȗk-Ȗ*) is not 
significantly different from 0.  
The results of the tests are reported in Table 10 and indicate that the frontier of foreign banks 
converges toward the metafrontier in the long run, whereas this is not true for either private 
or state banks
23
. This confirms our conclusion that the metafrontier is led by foreign banks 
and suggests a lack of significant technological spillovers between ownerships.  
<Insert Table 10> 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The main aim of this study is to assess the impact of regulatory reform on TFP growth and 
its sources and on the ownership-performance relationship for the case of Indian banks. We 
do so by implementing a novel methodological framework which leads to the estimation of 
TFP by means of a non-parametric sequential metafrontier Malmquist index and a 
parametric metafrontier Divisa index. 
Guided by two Narasimham Committee reports (in 1991 and 1998 respectively), the Indian 
Government introduced a series of financial sector reforms which fostered a uniform 
regulatory framework, theoretically creating a market with a level playing field. Despite the 
fact that nearly two decades have passed since the first Narasimham Committee report, we 
find evidence of continued heterogeneity across the industry. Departing from the existing 
literature on efficiency and productivity measurement, we explicitly tested and rejected the 
assumption of the existence of a common production technology, leading us to construct cost 
efficiency frontiers separately for each ownership type. Both DEA and SFA results indicate 
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relatively high levels of efficiency, which worsen after 1998. Results are consistent across 
methodologies for state-owned and foreign banks. Private banks are however a very 
heterogeneous group; they experience the largest number of entries (particularly post 1996) 
as well as exits or M&As.  Research shows that the performance of firms entering the market 
is normally below that of the average incumbent. When new small firms enter and exit the 
market, the variance of the distribution is likely to increase and this can explain the lower 
efficiency of private banks measured by DEA compared to SFA. Overall productivity, 
measured both by the DEA Malmquist and the SFA Divisia, is increasing over time. 
Consistently with previous literature, we find that this improvement is mainly due to 
improvements in technology.  
To be able to compare the results across ownership types, we estimate a generalised 
sequential metafrontier Malmquist index and a metafrontier Divisia index. Again, the overall 
TFP is positive and mainly driven by technological progress. Results also indicate that 
different ownership types reacted differently to changes in policy and to the operating 
environment. In particular, changes in regulatory regime generated a very favourable 
environment for foreign banks, which enabled them to use the best available technology in 
the industry and engage in cost technology innovation. The position of foreign banks 
becomes increasingly dominant over time and their production technology is becoming the 
best available technology in the industry. This is consistent with the removal of restrictions 
on their operations, which progressively allowed foreign banks to increasingly familiarize 
themselves with the local loans market. Foreign banks seem to have capitalised on the 
relative advantages of their asset portfolio. On the other hand, the increasing technological 
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gap between the best practice and the private and state banks frontier indicates a lack of 
significant technological spillovers. To conclude, financial reforms have benefited the Indian 
banking sector and resulted in sustained productivity growth. However, the benefits of 
reforms have not being uniformly distributed across ownership types, with state-owned 
banks losing the ability to act as undisputed industry leaders as well as losing customers and 
market share. An interesting extension to the current study would be a micro level analysis 
of the characteristics and determinants of ownership differences, with particular focus on 
bank risk. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Summary of parametric and nonparametric tests for the null hypothesis of a 
common technology among different ownership groups.  
 State vs. Private Foreign vs. Private Foreign vs. State 
T-test (equality of means) 
1992-1997 0.0000 0.0000 0.8217
1998-2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0561
1992-2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0769
Mann-Whitney test (equality of medians) 
1992-1997 0.0000 0.0000 0.2145
1998-2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.1321
1992-2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0476
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (equality of distributions) 
1992-1997 0.000 0.000 0.018
1998-2009 0.000 0.000 0.000
1992-2009 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kruskall-Wallis test (equality of distributions) 
1992-1997 0.0000 0.0000 0.2145
1998-2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.1321
1992-2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0476
Likelihood Ratio test (of parameter stability across ownerships) 
1992-2009 
0.0000 
(LR statistic = 386.8164) 
Note: the figures are the p-values associated with the relative test. 
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Table A2: Results from the estimation of the group specific SFA frontiers 
 STATE FOREIGN PRIVATE 
 Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Const -5.304 0.00 0.895 0.552 3.636 0.354 
lnY1 0.621 0.002 -0.079 0.758 -0.093 0.354 
lnY2 1.649 0.00 1.605 0.00 0.693 0.00 
lnY3 -0.560 0.001 -0.377 0.159 0.206 0.00 
lnP* -0.018 0.916 0.273 0.144 0.496 0.00 
lnY1lnY1 0.135 0.00 0.112 0.00 0.122 0.00 
lnY2lnY2 0.105 0.00 0.018 0.391 0.085 0.00 
lnY3lnY3 -0.019 0.007 0.024 0.170 -0.001 0.836 
lnP*lnP* 0.076 0.00 0.140 0.00 0.074 0.00 
lnY1lnY2 -0.306 0.00 -0.145 0.00 -0.194 0.00 
lnY1lnY3 0.029 0.248 -0.057 0.027 -0.022 0.031 
lnY2lnY3 0.038 0.163 0.044 0.189 0.015 0.21 
lnY1lnP* 0.021 0.495 0.025 0.351 0.017 0.459 
lnY2lnP* 0.048 0.105 -0.026 0.394 0.006 0.808 
lnY3lnP* -0.048 0.027 0.008 0.697 -0.009 0.50 
T -0.003 0.934 -0.100 0.015 0.026 0.055 
TT -0.001 0.202 -0.0002 0.782 0.0002 0.554 
lnY1T -0.002 0.642 -0.0011 0.749 0.001 0.686 
lnY2T 0.005 0.208 0.006 0.084 -0.002 0.472 
lnY3T -0.003 0.502 -0.002 0.557 -0.003 0.007 
lnP*T 0.009 0.041 0.002 0.655 -0.0002 0.927 
Br 0.000 0.017 0.002 0.00 0.000 0.142 
R -0.839 0.001 0.046 0.20 0.069 0.027 
RY1 0.102 0.041 - - - - 
RY2 -0.022 0.543 - - - - 
RY3 -0.042 0.292 - - - - 
RP* -0.133 0.006 - - - - 
CRR 0.003 0.109 -0.004 0.605 -0.0004 0.89 
SLR 0.004 0.071 0.0013 0.804 0.0012 0.56 
Mac 0.093 0.196 0.413 0.015 0.112 0.088 
O/n - - - - 0.108 0.35 
O/nY1 - - - - 0.019 0.336 
O/nY2 - - - - 0.014 0.511 
O/nY3 - - - - -0.043 0.01 
O/nP* - - - - -0.011 0.551 
O/nR - - - - -0.064 0.023 
    
Const 0.057 0.073 -  0.00 0.00 
R 0.167 0.024 - - 0.066 0.613 
T 0.016 0.118 - - -0.005 0.885 
TT -0.002 0.00 - - -0.001 0.411 
On - - - - -0.183 0.259 
OnR - - - - 0.100 0.489 
Log-likelihood 895.217  198.139  680.998  
Sigmasq 0.003  0.029  0.018  
gamma 0.828  0.8733  0.926  
O/n is a dummy set = 1 for “old” private banks who were in business prior to 1995, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table A3: Results from the estimation of the SFA Metafrontier  
 1992-1997 1998-2009
Const 4.373 9.448
lnY1 -0.142 -0.779
lnY2 0.848 1.099
lnY3 -0.009 -0.078
lnP* 0.312 0.023
lnY1lnY1 0.049 0.021
lnY2lnY2 0.014 -0.046
lnY3lnY3 -0.004 -0.005
lnP*lnP* 0.123 0.202
lnY1lnY2 -0.057 0.040
lnY1lnY3 0.005 0.000
lnY2lnY3 0.002 0.013
lnY1lnP* 0.016 0.104
lnY2lnP* -0.031 -0.079
lnY3lnP* 0.027 -0.008
T -0.108 -0.076
TT -0.002 0.003
lnY1T -0.024 -0.008
lnY2T 0.039 0.014
lnY3T -0.011 -0.007
lnP*T 0.003 -0.014
Br 0.00001 0.00001
CRR 0.003 -0.014
SLR 0.003 -0.049
Mac 0.256 0.28
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Table 1: Number of banks relative weight of different ownerships 
 
 Number of banks Proportion of total assets 
 State Foreign Private Industry State Foreign Private
1992 27 13 23 0.986 0.89 0.07 0.04
1998 27 15 33 0.988 0.82 0.08 0.10
2009 27 13 22 0.994 0.72 0.08 0.20
Note: The column industry reports the proportion of total assets of our sample over the whole industry  
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Table 2: Inputs and outputs summary statistics (1992-2009)  
Variable Mean Median Min Max Stdev 
C 10204 4193.9 12.668 250380 20920 
y1 65566 20274 48.48 2277632 151313 
y2 45538 15963 31.98 1179795 98493 
y3 1988 780 0.622 54257 4384 
w1 0.08 0.068 0.004 1.755 0.111 
w2 0.028 0.025 0.002 0.438 0.030 
Note: C= total operating cost; y1: performing loans; y2: other earning assets; y3: fee-based income; w1: loanable 
funds price; w2 = non-operating cost price. Cost and outputs are in Rs mil. All data are deflated using 1991 as 
the base year. 
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Table 3: Yearly average efficiency scores  
 STATE FOREIGN PRIVATE 
 SFA DEA SFA DEA SFA DEA 
1992-1997 0.923 0.910 0.888 0.906 0.945 0.692 
1998-2009 0.921 0.891 0.884 0.866 0.945 0.628 
1992-2009 0.922 0.897 0.885 0.880 0.945 0.649 
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Table 4: Total Factor Productivity Change 
 TFP
k 
TC
k
EC
k
SC
k 
 Divisia Malmq Divisia Malmq Divisia Malmq Divisia Malmq
STATE         
92-09 0.999 1.021 1.003 1.051 1.001 0.985 0.995 0.988
92-97 0.998 1.012 1.01 1.041 1.000 0.980 1.00 0.993
98-09 0.999 1.025 1.001 1.055 1.002 0.987 0.993 0.986
FOREIGN         
92-09 1.071 1.048 1.051 1.116 0.992 0.985 0.999 0.956
92-97 1.070 1.045 1.049 1.132 1.003 0.973 1.002 0.958
98-09 1.071 1.049 1.052 1.110 0.988 0.989 0.997 0.955
PRIVATE         
92-09 1.024 1.029 1.015 1.095 1.001 0.972 1.005 0.965
92-97 1.029 1.074 1.013 1.165 0.998 0.968 1.005 0.957
98-09 1.022 1.011 1.016 1.067 1.002 0.974 1.005 0.969
Note: The superscript k indicates results obtained with reference to group specific frontiers. TFP = total factor 
productivity; TC = technical change; EC = efficiency change; SC= scale change. Along with TFP the table 
reports only the 3 components of the Divisia index directly comparable with the Malmquist index: technical 
change, efficiency change and scale change. The Divisia values have been transformed from change rates into 
changes to make the comparison with the Malmquist possible 
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Table 5: Metafrontier Divisia Index 
 
 SC* TC*  EX* ALLC* EC* MU* TFP TFP2 
92-93 0.998 1.008 0.968 1.007 0.985 1.001 0.967 0.999
93-94 0.995 1.006 1.021 1.000 1.008 0.982 1.012 0.991
94-95 0.994 1.008 0.955 1.001 1.010 1.012 0.980 1.024
95-96 0.992 1.018 0.969 0.993 0.990 1.028 0.990 1.021
96-97 0.984 1.021 1.016 1.001 1.006 0.973 1.000 0.985
98-99 0.992 1.077 0.982 1.002 1.001 0.991 1.044 1.062
99-00 0.987 1.070 0.966 1.000 1.015 1.012 1.049 1.083
00-01 0.992 1.064 0.968 1.003 1.008 0.975 1.009 1.041
01-02 0.992 1.059 0.954 0.998 0.996 1.043 1.042 1.087
02-03 0.994 1.053 0.979 0.986 1.027 1.012 1.050 1.071
03-04 0.990 1.046 0.990 0.976 1.007 1.006 1.015 1.025
04-05 0.988 1.037 0.965 0.986 1.016 0.902 0.894 0.929
05-06 0.984 1.032 0.956 1.001 1.007 0.987 0.966 1.010
06-07 0.991 1.028 0.998 1.021 0.993 0.989 1.020 1.022
07-08 0.965 1.027 0.955 1.024 1.008 1.001 0.979 1.024
08-09 0.985 1.024 0.987 1.001 1.005 1.002 1.004 1.018
92-09 0.989 1.036 0.977 1.000 1.005 0.994 1.001 1.024
92-97 0.993 1.012 0.985 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.990 1.004
98-09 0.987 1.047 0.973 1.000 1.007 0.992 1.006 1.033
Note: The superscript * indicates results obtained with reference to the metafrontier. As in (5) the TFP change 
rate of the Divisia index is  given by the sum of scale effect (SC), technical change (TC), the effects of 
environmental variables (EX), allocative efficiency (ALLC), cost efficiency (EC) and the mark-up effect (MU). 
TFP2 reports overall TFP without taking into account the environmental factors not accounted for in the 
Malmquist index.  
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Table 6: Metafrontier Malmquist Index 
  
 SC* TC*  EC*  TFP* 
92-93 0.968 1.028 0.969 0.963 
93-94 0.969 1.116 1.042 1.126 
94-95 0.958 1.066 0.998 1.018 
95-96 1.007 1.029 0.938 0.975 
96-97 0.949 1.022 1.028 0.996 
97-98 0.983 1.067 1.058 1.109 
98-99 0.909 1.064 0.889 0.859 
99-00 0.958 1.112 1.107 1.178 
00-01 0.929 1.067 0.924 0.914 
01-02 1.003 1.401 0.968 1.356 
02-03 0.957 1.164 0.956 1.065 
03-04 0.924 1.256 0.976 1.132 
04-05 0.927 1.030 0.802 0.765 
05-06 0.949 1.007 1.032 0.986 
06-07 0.998 1.009 1.048 1.054 
07-08 1.010 1.050 1.064 1.131 
08-09 0.978 1.022 1.016 1.016 
92-09 0.963 1.085 0.986 1.030 
92-97 0.970 1.052 0.994 1.014 
98-09 0.958 1.102 0.977 1.030 
Note: The superscript * indicates results obtained with reference to group the metafrontie. TFP = total factor 
productivity; TC = technical change; EC = efficiency change; SC= scale change. 
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Table 7: Technological Gap Ratio, Cost Efficiency and Metaefficiency 
DEA 
 
 1992-1997 1998-2009 1992-2009
 
TGR 
State 0.862 0.740 0.781 
Foreign 0.810 0.810 0.810 
Private 0.706 0.764 0.745 
All 0.800 0.766 0.775 
     
 
EFF
k 
State 0.910 0.891 0.897
Foreign 0.906 0.866 0.880
Private 0.692 0.628 0.649
All 0.824 0.781 0.795 
     
 
EFF* 
State 0.784 0.702 0.713
Foreign 0.734 0.702 0.713
Private 0.492 0.481 0.485
All 0.659 0.595 0.616
SFA 
 
    
 
TGR 
State 0.949 0.826 0.867
Foreign 0.935 0.828 0.864
Private 0.891 0.765 0.806
All 0.924 0.802 0.842
     
 
EFF
k 
State 0.923 0.921 0.922
Foreign 0.888 0.884 0.885
Private 0.945 0.945 0.945
All 0.924 0.923 0.923
     
 
EFF* 
State 0.876 0.760 0.798
Foreign 0.830 0.7832 0.765
Private 0.842 0.722 0.761
All 0.853 0.739 0.777
Note: The superscript k indicates results obtained with reference to group specific frontiers; * indicates results 
obtained with reference to group specific frontiers. TGR = Technological Gap Ratio; EFFk-= cost efficiency; 
EFF* = metaefficiency. 
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Table 8: Number and proportion of technology leaders per ownership category 
 SFA DEA 
 1992-1997 1998-2009 1992-1997 1998-2009 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Foreign 11 34 12 48 10 19 40 38 
Private 9 28 7 28 9 17 30 29 
State 12 38 6 24 34 64 34 33 
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Table 9: catch-up index pre and post 1998 per ownership group. 
 SFA DEA 
 S F P S F P 
92-97 0.990 0.976 1.007 1.019 0.928 0.905 
98-09 1.047 0.996 1.030 1.082 0.968 1.004 
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Table 10: ADF test of convergence of (12) 
DEA Foreign State Private 
 Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
(γk-γ*) 0.0259 0.151 0.0437 0.327 0.0085 0.708
λ 0.7981 0.0230 0.8139 0.2900 0.5741 0.3254
SFA       
(γk-γ*) 0.0033 0.148 0.002 0.326 0.001 0.570
λ 0.108 0.049 0.188 0.355 0.037 0.121
Note: The equation is estimated from the ADF test with one lagged difference term. We report directly the value 
of λ. The ADF statistic is the t-ratio for –λ and its MacKinnon  p-value is reported here. 
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Figure 1: TGR distribution from SFA pre and post 1998 per ownership group 
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Figure 2: TGR distribution from DEA pre and post 1998 per ownership group 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 The positive impact of financial reforms on the technology of production is typically based on two arguments. 
First, the overall cost of producing at a given level of output is reduced by declining compliance cost. Second, 
regulatory reforms usually reduce restrictions on activities, thereby offering the opportunity for banks to take 
advantage of economies of scale and scope. Efficiency improvements are expected to arise from the increased 
competitive pressures that reduce managerial inefficiencies. 
2 For detailed reviews of the impact of financial reforms on the productivity change of banking systems see for 
example Mukherjee et al, (2001), and Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003).  
3 Deregulation seems to increase efficiency for all banks but does not result in inter-ownership convergence 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy, 2005); different ownerships react with different speeds to the change of 
regulatory environment (Isik and Hassan, 2003; Leightner and Lovell, 1998); ownership structure becomes 
neutral in terms of productivity growth and a diverse ownership structure also function as a stimulus to market 
competition (Sturm and Williams, 2004). A detailed literature review on this issue can be found in Sturm and 
Williams (2004).  
4 Structural deregulation was characterised by the removal of entry restrictions to private ownership, 
liberalization of interest rates on deposits and lending, and an increase in the range of permitted activities. 
Prudential norms related to assets classification, income recognition, provisioning, risk-based capital adequacy 
and informational disclosure.  
5 See Cole (2009) for a discussion of the relevance of bank ownership and economic growth. 
6 For a review of early literature see reviews by Berger and Humphrey (1997), and Goddard et al (2001). 
Reviews of more recent literature are presented, among others, by Berger (2007); Goddard et al (2007), Cook 
and Seiford (2009); Hughes and Mester (2010). 
7 Performing loans are measured as the difference between total loans and non-performing loans. Other earning 
assets aggregate government securities, other approved securities, shares, debentures and bonds, subsidiaries 
and joint ventures and other investment outside India (i.e. total investment).  
8 According to the accounting practice followed by the Indian banking sector post-1992, income accrual would 
cease once the loan is recognized as non-performing. Therefore, the interest received on loans recorded in the 
loss and profit account is associated with the performing loans. 
9  For a general review of the methodological approaches to efficiency and productivity measurement see for 
instance Fried et al. (2008).  
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10 The underscores c and v refer to whether the distance function is with respect to a constant returns to scale 
frontier or a variable returns to scale frontier. 
11 The estimation of a sequential frontier changes the superscript in Equation (1) from t to all the periods up to 
time t, i.e. 1,2,3,….t. The technical details can be found in Tulken and Vanden Eeckaut (1995) and Thirtle et al., 
(2003). 
12 This is essentially like a problem of degrees of freedom, leading to excessive estimates of efficiency when the 
number of variables is too high relative to the number of observations. 
13
 We did not introduce fixed effects into the model as most of the heterogeneity seemed handled satisfactorily 
by the chosen variables and the separation of the ownership frontiers, as usefully suggested by an anonymous 
referee. Indeed as noted by Zhou (2001) a fixed effects estimation uses within-groups variation; since many of 
the regressors change only gradually over time this can potentially lead to over control and an overshadowing of 
the cross sectional relationship. 
14 As we will see this choice based on a test of whether the data can be pooled. 
15 In (9) the hat notation indicates the estimator of the corresponding parameter. 
16 Given the focus of the paper and for reasons of space we do not provide a detailed discussion of  the 
ownership-specific frontiers. The results of their estimation are reported in Table A2 in the appendix. 
17Private banks are the most heterogeneous group in the sample, hence the more “noisy” as they experience the 
largest number of entries and exits, mergers and acquisitions and show significant differences also depending on 
whether they are “old” or “new”, as confirmed by the stochastic cost frontier results. The presence of all this 
noise cannot be accounted for by DEA which therefore ranks any of the bad performers much worse than SFA 
does. 
18 To make the comparison possible we transformed the TFP growth rate of the Divisia index into a TFP growth 
as the Malmquist. 
19 We also estimated a single metafrontier for the whole time period. The results were unsatisfactory and 
therefore are not reported. 
20 As discussed in the methodology section, TGR is computed as the ratio of metaefficiency to cost efficiency. 
21 Recall that increases in the technological gap ratios imply decreases in the gap between the group frontier and 
the metafrontier. The higher the ratio, the closer the group frontier is to the metafrontier (i.e. best available 
technology) and vice versa. 
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22 The notable difference in the absolute number of technology leaders between the two methodologies is 
explained by their deterministic vs stochastic nature. Indeed if we were to lower the threshold even just to 99% 
for SFA the results would be remarkably closer.   
23 The important point here is that the tests come to the same conclusion under both methodologies. The fact that 
the estimate of λ is different reflects the original significant difference in technical change in the single 
ownership frontiers discussed in that section. 
